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WASHINGTON -- A new nuclear arms control treaty signed by the United States and Russia in April would not limit future U.S. plans for missile defense, key military brass said yesterday (see GSN, June 16).
(Jun. 17) -
A U.S. Ground-based Midcourse Defense interceptor lifts off in an exercise last week at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. The successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty would place no significant limitations on U.S. missile defense options, top military officials said yesterday (U.S. Missile Defense Agency photo).
Nothing in the "New START" pact, currently before the U.S. Senate for ratification, would constrain the administration's missile defense plans, including the "phased adaptive approach" for regional missile defense in Europe, Lt. Gen. Patrick O'Reilly, director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "There are no limitations in the treaty on our plans for missile defense," he said.
His agency is responsible for testing and developing a multilayered defense against potential ballistic missile attacks on the United States and its allies.
Under White House plans, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system would employ interceptors based in Alaska and California to attempt to shoot down incoming strategic-range ballistic missiles during any limited strikes against the U.S. homeland.
In addition, according to its blueprint for phased defenses, the United States would deploy missile defense systems to Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean over the next two years. The military would then field increasingly advanced weapons that would protect Europe and the United States from Iranian missiles of any range by 2020.
The nation's top warfighting commander for missile defense also vouched for the agreement, which would replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
"As the combatant command ... responsible for synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations and advocacy, this treaty does not constrain any current missile defense plans," said U.S. Strategic Command chief Gen. Kevin Chilton.
U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed New START two months ago in Prague. Once ratified, the agreement would require the former Cold War adversaries to cut their respective strategic arsenals to 1,550 deployed warheads, down from a previously agreed level of 2,200, which was to be reached by 2012 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
Both countries would also keep their deployed nuclear delivery vehicles -- missiles, submarines and bombers -- at 700, with up to another 100 held in reserve.
Some Republican lawmakers have expressed concerns about a nonbinding unilateral statement that Russia issued April 7, just prior to the New START signing ceremony. In it, Moscow said it reserves the right to withdraw from the treaty if the United States augments its missile defenses beyond a certain level.
The GOP critics have raised questions about whether the Obama administration has struck a secret deal to allay Russian concerns, and have alleged that the Kremlin's unilateral statement about New START could ultimately hamstring U.S. missile-defense efforts (see GSN, May 3).
The Washington Times reported yesterday, citing unnamed U.S. officials, that Foggy Bottom is secretly working with Moscow on a draft agreement to allay Russian fears on missile defenses (see related GSN story, today).
On Tuesday, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller told the foreign relations panel that Washington had struck no secret bargains with Russia on missile defense or any other matters. Yesterday both commanders said they had no knowledge of any unspoken agreements, either.
The Russians understand that the United States will continue developing and fielding missile defenses into the future, O'Reilly said.
The assurances were not enough for some the committee's Republican members.
"If they understand, why are they making unilateral statements saying they've won and bested us in our ability to defend ourselves from missile attack?" asked Senator James Risch (R-Idaho).
Lawmakers in both nations must approve the treaty before it can enter into force. In the U.S. Senate, that would require yea votes from at least 67 lawmakers. The foreign relations panel has held eight hearings on the new agreement since the White House submitted it last month, including one classified session with the accord's negotiators.
Yesterday O'Reilly said the new treaty would actually eliminate some constraints the previous agreement put on developing a missile defense system.
For example, the missile agency's intermediate-range target booster system -- used in tests to demonstrate homeland defense capabilities and components of the phased adaptive approach -- was accountable under the previous treaty because it employed the first stage of the now-retired Trident 1 submarine-launched ballistic missile.
Those test assets would not be accountable under the newly minted arms control deal, which would provide the agency greater flexibility for utilizing retired components as missile-defense test targets, according to O'Reilly.
Risch grilled the MDA chief on what he said are limitations within the new treaty, such as a prohibition on the conversion of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Both O'Reilly and Chilton agreed that those limitations exist, but would apply to measures that were never included in U.S. plans anyway.
The options that are prohibited "would be ones that we would not choose, I wouldn't choose, [nor] any other director of missile defense because it ... gives us less capability than what we are currently pursuing now," O'Reilly told the Idaho lawmaker.
Chilton said launching a missile defense asset from an ICBM field also could create confusion in Moscow about U.S. intent.
Senator Richard Lugar (Ind.), the panel's ranking Republican, asked if Russian officials felt threatened that the fourth stage of the Obama administration's phased adaptive approach -- which would see a high-performance Standard Missile 3 deployed at land bases -- would come on line around the same time the successor agreement is slated to expire in 2020.
"The reality is we don't have the technical ability to deploy the sophisticated defense that would be necessary to really make a dent, or try to negate, the extensive Russian nuclear strategic arsenal," said Principal Deputy Defense Undersecretary for Policy James Miller, testifying alongside the two generals. The SM-3 would be in a "tail chase" if it were to go after a Russian ICBM, he added.
"The objective was effective missile defense against the threats that we see today and that we believe may emerge from Iran and others in the region," Miller said.
O'Reilly said it was not a very controversial topic in Moscow because the SM-3 is not large enough to reach Russia's "strategic fields."
Nuclear Weapons
Chilton, who also commands the country's nuclear forces, endorsed the arsenal cuts detailed in the new treaty, as well. Strategic Command provided military analysis to the administration's negotiators, he noted.
Other benefits of the new agreement include limiting the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads and strategic delivery vehicles, while at the same time allowing the United States to retain enough nuclear deterrent forces to hedge against "technical and geopolitical surprise," he said.
New START would also reestablish an arms control verification regime that disappeared when the original treaty expired in December, according to Chilton.
"If we don't get this treaty, A, they're not constrained in their development of force structure and, B, we have no insight into what they're doing. So it's the worst of both possible worlds," the combatant commander told the panel.
The White House's National Intelligence Estimate on the newly minted pact's monitoring capabilities would likely provide more transparency and insight on the verification issue, he added.
That document has yet to be submitted to lawmakers. It is expected to arrive on Capitol Hill before the August congressional recess, according to committee's press secretary, Jennifer Berlin.